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Degrowth and the Blue Belt: rethinking marine conservation in the 
British Overseas Territories 




The UK Government has developed a ‘Blue Belt’, a network of large Marine Protected Areas involving 
seven British Overseas Territories. The Blue Belt is now one of the world’s largest enclosures of space 
for conservation, enclosing four million km2 of ocean in some of the most remote spaces on earth. To 
be economically feasible, the UK’s bold conservation targets are integrated with wider tourism, fishing, 
and economic growth-motivated governance agendas. This commentary argues for a degrowth 
alternative to the Blue Belt’s development. The goal of degrowth is not to prevent increases in Gross 
Domestic Product, nor is degrowth the equivalent to recession in a growth economy. Sustainable 
degrowth provides a conservation framework for ensuring a just transition from neoliberal forms of 
governance that places local well-being and welfare needs above the interests of state actors, private 
investors, and holiday makers. In the current context of the Blue Belt, the commentary considers three 
nascent degrowth concepts for improving things: 1) blue degrowth, 2) degrowth tourism, and 3) 
degrowth environmental governance. The paper argues that instead of separating the UK from other 
spaces where biodiversity targets are realised, these targets should be used as opportunities to reconcile 
the UK’s colonial relationships with the territories, to build local capacity, and resilience.   
 







Coastal communities reliant on international tourism are experiencing significant change. The current 
COVID-19 pandemic will likely eliminate 50 million tourism sector jobs globally, translating into 
losses of around US$50 billion in spending by international visitors (UNWTO, 2020). Most countries 
are currently enforcing travel restrictions, including all of the British Overseas Territories (BOTs). 
Lock-down arrangements have resulted in the partial hibernation of fisheries brought on by the closure 
of restaurants and other fish retailers (Slack and Newbery, 2020). Recovery for the travel and fishing 
industry will be slow, and for the UK this will converge with disruptions caused by the country’s exit 
from the European Union (or Brexit) (Boyes and Elliott, 2016). When recovery does commence, the 
fraction of ocean species within biologically sustainable levels will likely continue to follow a 
decreasing trend, from 90% in 1974 to 67% today (Howson, 2020). To help protect what remains, the 
UK Government has developed a ‘Blue Belt’ – a network of large Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 
enclosing 4 million km2 of overseas territorial waters (MMO, 2019). However, in light of the current 
pandemic, Brexit, the continuing slowdown of the global economy (see Dorling, 2020), and ongoing 
decline in quality of marine environments globally, this commentary suggests that now is an ideal time 
to rethink conservation and development in the BOTs. 
The Blue Belt programme constitutes one of the world’s largest enclosures for marine conservation, 
involving a network of seven BOTs. The territories accommodate over 90% of the UK's biodiversity, 
meriting five UNESCO World heritage sites of natural and cultural significance as well as 15 Ramsar 





Figure 1: The Blue Belt programme sites (grey) and other British Overseas Territories (white) 
MPAs have historically been established as relatively small, inshore areas of coastal waters each tailor-
measured to protect specific habitats, ecosystem structures, functioning and integrity, and species 
diversity (Mora and Sale, 2011). In recent years, international conventions have challenged the 
traditional approach by calling for large-scale conservation networks enclosing up to 500,000km2 of 
ocean at a time (Nelson and Bradner, 2010; Visalli et al., 2020). To be economically feasible, these bold 
conservation objectives are integrated with wider tourism, fishing, and neoliberal governance agendas 
(De Santos, 2020). For the Blue Belt, many large MPAs do not offer protection to the most biodiverse 
and vulnerable inshore environments, favouring instead the least-threatened remote areas of ocean that 
are residual to commercial fishing (MMO, 2019). This ‘green growth’ model of marine conservation, 
based on ‘win-win’ approaches for government, investors and the environment, can undermine 
biodiversity targets whilst leading to inequitable distributions of costs and benefits, disproportionately 
impacting the lives of local people and their environments (Chaigneau and Brown, 2016). With a focus 
on the Blue Belt network of MPAs, this commentary argues for a degrowth approach. Such an 
alternative places local well-being and welfare needs above the interests of retreating state actors, profit-
seeking private investors, and holiday makers. Ultimately, understanding the local human dimensions 




what the network’s conservation concerns depend on. To seriously pursue degrowth would likely 
require drastic transformations to biodiversity policy, fisheries, the global tourism industry and its 
metabolism (Fletcher et al., 2019). The following section broadly considers what degrowing 
conservation might look like. The paper then explores the current neoliberal context of the Blue Belt 
specifically, before considering opportunities for shifting to a degrowth alternative. As a theoretical 
principle, degrowth is new, yet its applications are already numerous. The commentary considers three 
of these nascent degrowth concepts relevant to the Blue Belt: 1) blue degrowth, 2) degrowth tourism, 
and 3) degrowth environmental governance. The paper concludes with some recommendations for 
future research. 
 
2. From green growth to degrowth 
For the UK, the Blue Belt is part of a wider green growth discourse, promoting industrial growth to 
enable marine conservation (UK Gov, 2018). Green growth is flexibly defined as economic growth that 
is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive (UNEP, 2016). The concept is rooted in 
sustainable development rhetoric, which ignores the ways economic growth eventually exhausts non-
renewable energy and material resources while posing unrealistic expectations of efficiency 
improvements. The ascent of green growth thinking shows that things green have become big business 
and an integral part of the mainstream growth economy (Fletcher, 2012). However, far from decoupling 
material consumption with economic growth, green marketing has been shown to increase consumption 
as relative prices fall (Kallis, 2019). In line with conventional economic theory that informs most green 
growth thinking, ‘eco-tourism’ and other cultural services markets are seen as an economically efficient 
means of conserving biodiversity, without curtailing growth. Despite historical and forecasted increases 
in carbon emissions and resource use from tourism, green growth has become an integral component of 
industry discourse on tourism and sustainability (Hall, 2013). The rapid consumption of marine 
ecosystems including for tourism purposes calls into question the feasibility of growth itself including 
the extent to which tourism can remain sustainable in the face of negative impacts (Fletcher et al., 2019). 




900 million tonnes in 2018 will triple by 2050 (ICAO, 2019). These emissions would take up 25% of 
the global anthropogenic carbon budget (Pidcock, 2016). Increasing flights to well-conserved pristine 
places, is unlikely to improve things (Howson, 2018). Tourism does not automatically protect local 
biodiversity either. More often than not, instead of raising awareness and providing a stake in 
conservation efforts, tourists’ close-encounters with endangered species actually increases the 
likelihood of environmental crime and consumption of those species (Rizzolo, 2017). If an imperative 
for growth is the obstacle in the face of sustainability globally, then such a model needs challenging. 
Arguably, the goal of any growth-based model is to maintain economic stability. Despite the proven 
unsustainability, fragility and inequality exposed by cyclical meltdowns in the global economy, 
perpetual growth is commonly judged to be a stabilising force on society, while a sustainable degrowth 
alternative is considered intolerably unstable (Jackson, 2017). This logic is faulty. The sustainable 
growth paradigm is rooted in a cognitive dissonance that ignores the impossibility of ever-expanding 
growth on a planetary scale. Furthermore, as Jackson (2017, 161) confirms, “our degrowth is not their 
recession”. The goal of degrowth is not to prevent increases in GDP, nor is degrowth the equivalent to 
recession in a growth economy. Prolonged recessions cause unemployment, economic insecurity and 
associated negative social impacts. Degrowth is “a missile concept designed to open up a debate 
silenced by the sustainable development consensus” (Jackson, 2017, 162). GDP will inevitably decline 
as an outcome of degrowth policies, but in a socially and environmentally sustainable way (Kallis, 
2019). Green growth, inclusive growth, sustainable growth: these would all be coherent concepts, and 
necessary approaches to managing an accelerating economy. However, the global economy has hit a 
wall. The slowdown, according to Dorling (2020), is not a temporary blip on the way to sunnier uplands, 
as humanity continues apace with ‘the great acceleration’. Short term events, like the COVID-19 
pandemic and associated global lockdown, are partly to blame. However, population growth and 
demographic changes globally clearly highlight a radical change in direction. The question is, does the 
end of the great acceleration signpost a need for more neoliberal market environmentalism, or a just 





3. Neoliberal governance of the Blue Belt and its discontents 
The UK government’s growth-orientated conservation strategy of the BOTs have followed the 
geopolitical aspirations of the neoliberal state. The BOTS are made up of 14 dependent territories under 
the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the UK. Each territory has a unique legal relationship to the UK, but 
none are constitutionally part of it. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) retains 
responsibility for matters of defence and diplomatic relations. Vagueness around UK-BOT relationships 
have allowed for governmental flexibility in terms of UK welfare provision obligations over time, and 
opportunities for value extraction (Clegg et al., 2016). Drower (1992, 49) explored how particular 
territories have been used for colonial extraction of resources and “scoring party points,” rather than 
promoting the well‐being of their inhabitants. Evolving UK-BOT relations have been dependent on 
individual UK MPs’ interests in certain territories. Constantine (2015) examined these informal 
geopolitics, highlighting how, following a visit to the territories in 1958, Anglesey MP, Cledwyn 
Hughes became defacto constituency Member of Parliament (MP) to St Helena. With just a few brief 
exceptions, the BOTs have not come to prominence in UK public debate collectively (Harmer, 2018). 
Individually, Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands (BVI) have recently been publicly implicated in 
the ‘Panama Papers’ scandal (Pegg, 2018). In 2016 delays and overspending on airport developments 
on St Helena placed the tiny South Atlantic territory into the public consciousness if only fleetingly. In 
2017, Hurricane Irma caused significant damage across several Caribbean territories. The slow response 
and insufficient scale of the UK Government's response received international criticism, particularly in 
comparison with swift and effective French and Dutch relief efforts on neighbouring islands (Davidson, 
2017). The implications of Brexit for BOTs like Gibraltar have also helped highlight the vague 
relationship between the UK government and the territories (Boffey, 2020). 
From 2010, the UK’s conservative led government’s vague leadership of the BOTs was echoed through 
its strategy on global environmental issues. Although their ‘Vote Blue, Go Green’ slogan had a positive 
impact on the party’s image, the Conservatives failed to enhance their green credentials, especially with 
regards to climate change and marine conservation. In 2015 the Great British Oceans coalition 




Society for the Protection of Birds, and Zoological Society of London) was keen that the flood of public 
concern inspired by the popular Blue Planet II TV series was channelled towards the UK Government 
in order to protect 4 million square kilometres of ocean in a Blue Belt around the BOTs by 2020 (GBO, 
2015). A social media campaign with the hashtag #BackTheBlueBelt was used to persuade Blue Planet 
II viewers to contact their local MP asking them to sign-up to a Blue Belt Charter. Celebrity advocates 
marshalled their massive followings. During the final episode of Blue Planet II focusing on the scourge 
of oceanic plastic, the hashtag was used every 1.8 seconds with someone tweeting their MP every 7.5 
seconds (Lorenzo, 2018). As the Blue Belt would have minimal impact on the lives of UK voters, the 
conservation strategy was a simple way to deliver Conservative green growth election pledges. 
Although the Blue Belt MPAs proposed for the BOTs could do very little on their own to reduce plastic 
pollution in remote areas of ocean, plastic was the UK environment secretary, Michael Gove’s focus. 
The images of oceanic plastics and the damage done to the world’s oceans shown in Blue Planet II, he 
said haunted him (Rawlinson, 2017).  
Images of environmental challenges in the BOTs had provided helpful cover for UK geopolitical 
interests in the past. In 2010 the UK’s foreign secretary, David Miliband, gave the go-ahead for an 
IUCN category 1 (‘no-take’) MPA covering 640,000 km2 of ocean surrounding the Chagos Islands. 
While the MPA suited the UK and the US, who operated a large military base and site for US strategic 
‘nefarious activities’ (Cobain, 2015), it caused insult to injury for many exiled Chagossians. These 
exiles, many of whom had never moved away from Gatwick, their port of disembarkation 40 years 
earlier, had been subject to arbitrary arrest and forced removal from their homeland. The MPA existed 
to stymie their return whilst enabling the ongoing UK-US lease agreement (Pearce, 2014).  
The developing Blue Belt strategy connected with the UK government’s neoliberal apron-string cuts – 
enabling reduced dependence for the territories on the UK treasury for day-to-day spending, whilst 
meeting national conservation objectives (UK Gov, 2019). Neoliberal streamlining of funding for the 
BOTs was also understood as an effective means by which relationships with the UK could be 
strengthened. A UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report entitled Global Britain and 




term vision must be based on a clear-eyed assessment of how the UK will balance the needs of 
individual [BOTs] against value for money for UK taxpayers. There must be scope to ask hard questions 
about the long-term sustainability and viability of individual [BOTs] without further significant levels 
of UK capital investment. If the Government does not think significant capital investment is possible, 
then it must be frank about what it will spend and towards what end” (p4). Despite the grand neoliberal 
agenda and significant investments from the UK Government in various BOTs, success was rarely 
achieved. The UK Government reported serious concerns in 2019 stating that “despite significant 
capital investment in some [BOTs] in recent years, much more remains to be done to provide 
infrastructure in [BOTs] such as Montserrat, Tristan da Cunha and St Helena, with no clear end in sight 
(UK Gov, 2019, p7)”.  
BOTs providing reliable revenue streams for the UK treasury have been omitted from the Blue Belt 
programme, for example, with the discovery and development of the Sea Lion oilfield in the Falkland 
Islands (Ficenec, 2015). However, the Government of the Falklands is expecting the economic benefits 
of fossil fuel extraction to come with significant environmental and social impacts as well as 
geopolitical implications (Dodds and Benwell, 2010). Highly populated Caribbean islands have also 
been excluded from the Blue Belt. The Cayman Islands are a central territory in the global tax haven 
network. The territory provides legal efficiencies, tax-minimisation and secrecy for many large UK 
companies (Peretti, 2016). The territory has also been implicated with illegal logging in the Brazilian 
Amazon as well as being implicated in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing globally 
(Galaz et al., 2018). Despite their fragile ecosystems, territories like these are not low hanging fruit ripe 
for Blue Belt MPAs. Such interventions have been reserved exclusively for the least-threatened remote 
areas of ocean that are mostly residual to commercial interests (De Santo, 2020). The most remote 
territories, such as Pitcairn and St Helena, are dependent on UK aid and are struggling to navigate the 
UK Government’s growth agenda. If the territories do grow, some will no longer qualify for Official 
Development Assistance, but will be too poor to manage without it (Thomas, 2018). For the Blue Belt 
territories, responding to growth requirements means scaling-up tourism, fisheries and marine 




4. Towards a degrowth model of conservation for the Blue Belt 
4.1 Blue degrowth 
Concepts such as the ‘blue economy’, ‘blue capital’, and ‘blue growth’ have evolved as synonyms, all 
with the same basic premise to promote economic benefits from human activities within ocean spaces, 
while ensuring sustainable economic growth (Eikeset et al., 2018). Degrowth has not been discussed in 
the context of marine conservation and fisheries until very recently. Through an analysis of regional 
fisheries and maritime policies, Hadjimichael (2018) argues that economic growth is the main and 
principal driver behind neoliberal sustainability narratives. In much the same way as the UK’s Blue 
Belt programme, growth is the root cause of most social problems within marine environments (Ertör 
and Hadjimichael, 2019). A blue degrowth approach is required to open up this discussion. Tourism 
and fisheries development within the Blue Belt will undoubtedly equate with increased consumption of 
local fishes. For St Helena, Tristan da Cunha (TdC) and South Georgia & South Sandwich Islands 
(SGSSI), developing economically sustainable fisheries has meant scaling up, rather than scaling back, 
commercial fishing. To ensure a world class diving (and dining) experience for tourists, the St Helena 
government have advocated catch-size increases to enable a local fishery able to meet the forecasted 
demand increase (St Helena Government, 2016). Elsewhere in the tropics, where year-round tourist 
destinations include inshore reefs, dive tourism has been shown to contribute significantly as a stressor 
on highly-sensitive eco-systems, necessitating some authorities to restrict even the use of sunblock 
whilst bathing (Handley, 2020). Tourists visiting dive sites also tend to eat the important fish species 
they are viewing (Wabnitz et al., 2018).  
To increase catch sizes across the Blue Belt, cold storage facilities have been constructed in TdC and 
St Helena by the Falkland Islands-registered Argos Fishing Company. The St Helena facility was 
originally purposed for processing mostly South Atlantic toothfish caught in the waters around the 
Falklands. In 2015 Argos vacated the facility, which was massively oversized for the relatively small 
catches of tuna landed by St Helena’s 14 independent, mainly inshore fishing boats targeting fish using 
a one by one method advocated by the International Pole and Line Foundation (IPNLF). In the hands 




required significant increases in domestic catch sizes passing through for processing. To scale things 
up quicker, long-lining was promoted through provisions in marine management plans, despite high 
levels of shark bycatch reported by observers (St Helena Gov, 2016). To discourage independent 
fishermen from selling their artisanal catches independently of the Corporation, all fish sold had to meet 
stringent hygiene and labelling standards, which could only be ensured for fish passing through the 
giant processing plant. Prices for these fish were dictated by the Corporation. All other fish sales from 
small-scale artisanal efforts was considered ‘black market’ by the St Helena authorities, attracting fines 
and other penalties (St Helena Gov, 2017). The Blue Belt programme also allows for upscaling in the 
Pitcairn Islands. Although situated within a strict no-take MPA, Pitcairn islanders are able to fish 
inshore waters without restriction (MMO, 2019). These catches will unfoundedly increase with tourism 
development, disrupting the current sustainable metabolism of the islands.  
For degrowth thinkers, social metabolism refers to the material and energy flows required to maintain 
social systems at various scales and levels (Bogadóttir, 2020). Across the Blue Belt a growth-based path 
towards self-sufficiency and independence increases the social metabolic rate, necessitating greater 
levels of material consumption, yet this is the goal of the UK government in constructing the Blue Belt. 
Due to their size and remoteness, the Blue Belt territories are never likely to operate sustainable growth 
economies (Lewis 2018). Despite this, in Foreign Affairs Committee meetings in 2018, discussing ‘the 
future of the UK Overseas Territories’, Lord Ahmad, UK Minister for the Commonwealth and UN, 
concluded that “if one were to say, ‘What do I aspire to as the Minister responsible for Overseas 
Territories?’ it is to create economies that are self-sustaining and growing”. A degrowth model of 
development for the Blue Belt needs to challenge this neoliberal assumption that dependence is a 
scourge, while its opposites – independence, autonomy and freedom – are unproblematic (Ferguson 
2013). If independence requires scaling-up catch sizes to unsustainable levels, then dependence and 






4.2 Degrowth tourism 
As a mechanism for funding marine conservation, tourism is problematic. As Buscher et al (2012) 
argue, disingenuous eco-tourism is rarely sensitive to local people or eco-systems. Even the most 
responsible projects of tourism often fail to deliver the societal and environmental benefits they promise 
(Scheyvens, 2011). Where the practice avoids causing direct harm to those under foot, tourism remains 
dependent upon structural inequalities and global patterns of spatially uneven development (Harvey, 
2006). ‘Nature-based’, ‘eco’ or ‘conservation’ tourism are key drivers of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2018). 
The ecotourism industry is claimed to be the most rapidly expanding sector of the tourism industry 
(Fletcher & Neves, 2012). Yet, to get on the ecotourism shelf, outfits only need to produce a few 
spurious claims through disingenuous marketing of environmental performance. Potential for a 
degrowth approach to development has been explored in relation to a variety of economic sectors. 
Application of the concept to coastal tourism development has been relatively limited (Fletcher et al, 
2019). Buen vivir (Caria and Domínguez, 2015), localism and slow tourism have all made important 
theoretical contributions for conservation and could contribute to efforts towards a degrowth model for 
the Blue Belt. Across the seven Blue Belt nodes, five currently promote themselves for tourism 
development, of which three offer on-island accommodation to tourists. Although airfields operate on 
four of the Blue Belt territories, only St Helena currently welcomes tourists arriving via regular 
scheduled flights. Pitcairn Islands and Tristan de Cunha allow visitor access via scheduled sea crossings 
(see Table 1). 
 





for Conservation of 
Nature category) 
 
Ascension Island 800 Wideawake Airfield 
(military and 
diplomatic flights 
only), private yacht,  
cruise ship 
 
None IUCN Category 1 MPA 
(100% Exclusive 




250 Rothera Airfield 
(research and 
commercial charter 
Camping IUCN Category 1 MPA 




flights), private yacht, 
cruise ship  
 





Diego Garcia Airfield 
(US military and 
diplomatic flights 
only). No tourist 
access. 1-week heritage 




None IUCN Category 1 MPA 
(100% EEZ – 640,000 
km²) 
Pitcairn Islands 45 Private yacht, fishing 




IUCN Category 1 MPA 
(100% of offshore EEZ – 
834,000 km²) 
 
South Georgia & 
South Sandwich 
Islands 
35 Private yacht, cruise 
ship 
Camping IUCN mixed category 
MPA (100 % EEZ – 1.07 
million km²) 
 
St Helena 4,500 Jamestown Airfield 
(commercial flights), 
private yacht, fishing 







IUCN Category 6 MPA 
(100 % EEZ – 445,000 
km²) 
Tristan da Cunha 240 Private yacht, cruise 





MPA in development 
 
Table 1: Tourism capacity for each Blue Belt node 
 
For Busher and Fletcher (2020), a convivial form of conservation requires a shift from eco-touristic 
voyeurism, which is often directly responsible for ecosystem destruction (Higgins-Desbiolles et al., 
2019), to meaningfully engaged visitation focused on social and ecological justice.  For the Blue Belt, 
this may necessitate swapping fast planes for slow boats. Until very recently, the Blue Belt territories 
remained some of the few places in the world where travel times from any major port of embarkation 
could be measured in days. Decommissioning St Helena’s only regular connection with the outside 
world, the Royal Mail Ship (RMS) St Helena, in favour of a commercial airport has had significant 
impacts on St Helena’s economy and environment. Up until 2017, St Helena was two days away from 
its nearest neighbour, Ascension Island, and five days from South Africa. The Island’s natural habitats 




heritage and the well-conserved natural terrestrial and marine environment (JNCC, 2019). The island is 
now on target to realise projections of 30,000 tourists a year by 2030 (St Helena Gov, 2018). Associated 
infrastructure development includes airport facilities and a new dock, as well as dive shops, an 18-hole 
golf course and a 165-bedroom hotel and country club. The cost of a return flight from South Africa to 
St Helena is the same as ten days on-board the RMS, where all-inclusive buffets, quizzes and cabarets 
provided the tourist, interested in meaningfully engaged visitation, with opportunities to befriend St 
Helenians (or Saints) (Ros and O’Hare, 2019). Most tourists now fleetingly reside as strangers. 
Across the Blue Belt, tourists continue to rely on campsites, private homestays and guesthouses, staying 
with or in the homes of local residents. Accommodation platforms, like AirBnB are not widely used 
due to unreliable and expensive internet connections. A degrowth model of development should restrict 
such modes of platform capitalism, which reintermediate and thereby appropriate the monopoly rents 
generated through a privileged market position (Srnicek, 2017). Alternatives could include 
decentralised platform cooperative models (see Crandall, 2019). Large private resorts would likely 
marginalise local hosts altogether. Green taxes and tourist levees could help provide the necessary social 
support systems for local people. However, social safety nets dependent on these revenues alone could 
lead to increasingly precarious livelihoods. Slow tourism, which might go some way to diversify these 
revenues, is not unproblematically sustainable (Dodds, 2012). Slow tourism usually coexists with fast 
modes of travel and neither are inherently sympathetic to local welfare and well-being (Oh et al., 2016). 
However, broadening the scale of degrowth’s application, promoting democratic and convivial tourism 
across the Blue Belt, as well as a less alienating economy at home means people probably will not need 
to go on short/fast extractive annual holidays anyway. 
4.3 Degrowth environmental governance 
For advocates of degrowth there is a tension between a desire for local autonomy and the need for action 
at a broader scale (Kallis, 2018). Relocalising an economy, namely shortening the distances between 
production and consumption, is a common degrowth principle, and a necessity for global sustainability 
even if local production does not always mean lower environmental impacts close by (Otero et al., 




appropriations of land and property. Decolonial degrowth is a strategy of “recovery, renewal, and 
resistance (resurgence) through practices of re-rooting and re-commoning” (Demaria, et al, 2019, 440). 
While decolonial degrowth is unlikely to arise out of current global governance policies (Ford and 
Kuetting, Forthcoming), successful examples of community level environmental governance are 
evident and may serve as inspiration for degrowth within and beyond the Blue Belt. 
The neo-liberal environmental governance of the Blue Belt to date has entailed shifting responsibility 
for resource governance from states to non-state actors where possible, while also maintaining a 
colonial presence. For most Blue Belt territories, skilled civil service roles are filled by UK candidates 
on short contracts, usually 2-years in duration. Transience in these critical roles causes knowledge 
deficits in the early stages of contracts, with many staff lacking necessary proficiency, until becoming 
more experienced and knowledgeable of local conservation contexts, at which point they are replaced. 
Environmental governance also relies on networks of NGOs. The UK and BOT governments have 
resisted calls by a number of large international NGOs to implement strict ‘no-take’ (IUCN Cat 1) 
MPAs in some cases, but actively supported them in others. The Pew Charitable Trust and other 
members of the Great British Oceans coalition, have successfully lobbied for such an approach for 
Pitcairn, Ascension, Chagos and part of the Antarctic territory (CIWEM, 2020). Such an approach was 
considered desirable in these locations due to a near total absence of a domestic off-shore commercial 
fishery (MMO, 2018). Category 1 ‘no-take’ MPAs in these and other locations have proven far more 
effective in attracting donor-support, compared to Category 6 approaches (Hill, 2017). Such support is 
considered essential for resourcing the necessary monitoring, surveillance and enforcement 
infrastructure, including expensive off-shore patrol vessels able to apprehend unlicensed fishers. 
However, it is only through engagement with local fishers, that IUU fishing is controlled (CEFAS, 
2012). Maintaining an effective Category 6 approach to environmental protection in St Helena and TdC 
was partly enabled through the deferral of such responsibilities away from central government planners 
and NGOs, towards a network of local users of these environments (IPNLF, 2018). 
To enable local capacity building in conservation policy, as well as to incentivise sustainable 




a novel strategy for funding biodiversity conservation that moves beyond market-based instruments or 
performance-based cash transfer schemes. Replacing UK government aid packages for those Blue Belt 
nodes in receipt of them, these CBI payments could be considered as forms of decolonial reparation or 
as a payment for ecosystem service provision. CBI could be considered a form of compensation for 
opportunity costs – the impact of conservation interventions on recipients' lives. Contrary to Wilson’s 
(2016) Half Earth logic, for territories where ‘local’/’native’ populations have been erased by the 
colonial state, for example in the Chagos Islands where expelling indigenous knowledge has proved 
destructive to local habitats. People in these spaces have proved crucial parts of the ecosystem 
controlling invasive rat populations whilst enhancing coral reef productivity and functioning (Graham 
et al., 2018). Aiming to separate humanity from non-human nature is not a degrowth aim. Where human 




The UK Government has established a Blue Belt, a network of large MPAs enclosing four million km2 
of overseas territorial waters. The Blue Belt is now one of the world’s largest enclosures of space for 
conservation, involving seven BOTs. The UK’s strategy of enclosing 48% of its maritime space for 
sustainable use is not a radical one. France plans to protect 22% of its marine territory as MPAs, the US 
has reached 26% (De Santos, 2020). The IUCN is keen to adopt a target of fully protecting at least 30% 
of the world’s oceans (IUCN, 2016). To fit with mainstream growth agendas, these bold conservation 
objectives tend to be integrated with wider tourism, fishing, and neoliberal governance. In the aftermath 
of COVID-19 global lockdowns, international tourism will slow down (Dorling, 2020). Britain’s exit 
from the European Union means the UK is undergoing radical changes in fishing arrangements, which 
will likely put pressure on overseas territorial waters. The British Commonwealth and BOTs have been 
frequently promoted as a reasonable alternative set of trading partners to the EU (Watts, 2017). Casting 
UK nets towards remote BOTs, may prove politically uncomplicated, but will have significant 




growth-oriented post-COVID-19 recovery, increased tourism may prove environmentally and socially 
disastrous for the BOTs. This commentary suggests a rethink for the Blue Belt, based on a sustainable 
degrowth model of conservation. As a theoretical principle, degrowth is new, yet its applications are 
already numerous. The commentary has considered three nascent degrowth concepts relevant to the 
Blue Belt: 1) blue degrowth, 2) degrowth tourism, and 3) degrowth environmental governance. In order 
to ensure the Blue Belt develops as an effective environmental governance strategy, rather than simply 
as a mode of re-regulating post-colonial territorial arrangements, local welfare and wellbeing must be 
central to conservation objectives. This convivial Blue Belt should avoid dividing the UK’s growth 
economy from other spaces where the UK’s biodiversity policy targets are realised. Such targets should 
be used as opportunities to reconcile scars of colonial injustice, to increase local capacity and in some 
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